{"id":170041,"date":"2024-09-17T17:34:53","date_gmt":"2024-09-17T17:34:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/af.dawatmedia24.com\/?p=170041"},"modified":"2024-09-17T17:35:36","modified_gmt":"2024-09-17T17:35:36","slug":"isk-daykundi-attack-and-pakistans-strategic-use-of-isk-to-destabilize-afghanistan-amid-internal-security-challenges","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/af.dawatmedia24.com\/?p=170041","title":{"rendered":"ISK Daykundi attack and Pakistan\u2019s Strategic Use of ISK to destabilize Afghanistan Amid Internal Security Challenges"},"content":{"rendered":"

ISK Daykundi attack and Pakistan\u2019s Strategic Use of ISK to destabilize Afghanistan Amid Internal Security Challenges<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

Pakistan’s involvement in using groups like the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK) to destabilize Afghanistan can be viewed through a complex mix of geopolitical, security, and strategic interests. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan\u2019s intelligence agency, has a history of leveraging non-state actors for its strategic goals, as seen in Kashmir and Afghanistan. There are several reasons why Pakistan might use ISK to create disturbances in Afghanistan, such as the recent attack on the Shia population in Daykundi:<\/p>\n

Strategic Depth and Influence in Afghanistan<\/b>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>Historically, Pakistan has sought to maintain influence in Afghanistan as a buffer against Indian influence and to secure its western border. Following the fall of the U.S.-backed Afghan government, Pakistan initially supported the Taliban\u2019s return to power. However, tensions have risen, particularly over border issues along the Durand Line. By supporting or facilitating ISK operations, Pakistan may aim to:<\/p>\n

Undermine the Taliban\u2019s government, which has resisted Pakistan’s encroachments along the border.<\/b><\/p>\n

Maintain leverage in Afghanistan\u2019s internal politics, ensuring that no group becomes too dominant or hostile to Pakistani interests.<\/b><\/p>\n

This strategy aligns with the broader geopolitical objectives of Pakistan, which have historically involved using insurgent groups to exert control in Afghanistan and counterbalance Indian influence. The Dabori Agreement between Pakistan\u2019s intelligence services and Daesh leadership, as revealed by former TTP commander Ehsanullah Ehsan, underlines the lengths to which Pakistan has gone to maintain influence through proxy actors. The Dabori Agreement, named after the town of Dabori in Orakzai district, demonstrates how Pakistan has fostered a relationship with ISIS to ensure strategic outcomes in Afghanistan.<\/p>\n

Creating Internal Instability in Afghanistan ISK, which is ideologically opposed to the Taliban, can be used to exacerbate sectarian violence, such as the attack on Afghanistan\u2019s Shia population in Daykundi. This creates internal challenges for the Taliban government, diverting their attention from Pakistan’s border issues and limiting their ability to consolidate control over the country. By fomenting instability, Pakistan can further weaken the Taliban regime and maintain Afghanistan as a fragile state dependent on Pakistan.<\/p>\n

Use of Proxy Groups in Regional Strategy<\/b>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>Pakistan has a long history of supporting insurgent groups as part of its regional strategy, as evidenced by its role in Kashmir and its links to various jihadist groups. Ehsanullah Ehsan, a former Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) commander, pointed out that Pakistan\u2019s military and ISI have been utilizing ISK in a manner similar to how they engaged in Kashmir. The tactic of infiltrating militants into Afghanistan under the cover of military operations mirrors the “Kashmir-style infiltration.” In Afghanistan, ISK serves as a proxy force that can create chaos while allowing Pakistan to maintain plausible deniability. Ehsan\u2019s revelation about Pakistan’s ties with ISIS leadership in the Dabori<\/b> Agreement strengthens claims of Pakistani involvement in manipulating terrorist networks to destabilize Afghanistan.<\/p>\n

Deflecting Attention from Domestic Security Issues:<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>Pakistan has been experiencing severe internal security problems, as evidenced by the deadly incidents in August 2024, where 254 people were killed. The Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS) reported that among the dead were 92 civilians, 54 security personnel, and 108 militants. Additionally, 150 people were injured, including 88 civilians, 35 security personnel, and 27 militants. A total of 83 attacks were carried out across the country during this period. By supporting ISK attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan can divert the attention of militant groups operating within its own borders. This creates an external conflict that can distract these groups or at least diffuse some of the militant activity out of Pakistan, keeping the focus on Afghanistan instead.<\/p>\n

Durand Line Disputes and Border Skirmishes<\/b>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>The recurring border skirmishes between Afghan and Pakistani forces, such as the heavy artillery exchange in Sirkanay district in January 2024, are indicative of the broader territorial tensions. The Taliban has accused Pakistan of attempting to settle and encroach along the Durand Line, and this has led to retaliatory actions by the Afghan military. Pakistan, for its part, has blamed the Taliban\u2019s opposition to border fencing for the clashes. Supporting ISK can serve as a way to keep the Taliban occupied with internal security challenges, making it harder for them to push back against Pakistan\u2019s border moves.<\/p>\n

Targeting Shia Communities<\/b>:<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>ISK\u2019s ideological opposition to Shia Islam aligns with Pakistan’s broader sectarian dynamics. Pakistan has a history of sectarian violence, particularly against its Shia minority. By enabling ISK to target Shia populations in Afghanistan, Pakistan might be:<\/p>\n

Fostering sectarian divisions within Afghanistan<\/b>, preventing unity within Afghan society.<\/p>\n

Disrupting Iran\u2019s influence in Afghanistan<\/b>: As Iran is a major supporter of Shia groups in the region. This serves Pakistan\u2019s goal of limiting Iranian influence near its borders.<\/p>\n

Complex Relationships with TTP and Other Groups<\/b>:<\/span><\/p>\n

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which operates both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, also plays a role in these dynamics. While the TTP has historically been opposed to the Pakistani state, there have been reports of factional splits and shifting alliances. Pakistan\u2019s military and ISI may exploit these divisions, using elements of the TTP or ISK to further their own strategic goals. Ehsanullah Ehsan\u2019s statements suggest that Pakistan may be using ISK in coordination with its military to achieve its aims in Afghanistan, particularly along the Durand Line.<\/p>\n

Conclusion:<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span>Pakistan\u2019s use of ISK to create disturbances in Afghanistan, such as the attack on the Shia population in Daykundi, can be understood as part of its broader strategy to maintain influence in Afghanistan, counterbalance the Taliban\u2019s power, and divert attention from its own internal security challenges. The Dabori Agreement, highlighted by Ehsanullah Ehsan, cements the relationship between Pakistan\u2019s intelligence apparatus and ISIS leadership in a bid to destabilize Afghanistan while avoiding direct confrontation with the Taliban, thus preserving its strategic interests in the region.<\/p>\n

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